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nding is that risk aversion
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1 Introduction
Economic theory has been analyzing the e¤ect of uncertainty on investment for more than forty
years. One seminal strand of the literature starts with Oi (1961), followed by Hartman (1972) and
Abel (1983). They show that, in a perfectly competitive environment, an increase in output-price
uncertainty raises the investment of a risk-neutral rm with a constant returns to scale technology.
Intuitively, this is because constant returns to scale imply that the marginal revenue product of
capital rises more than proportionally with the output price when rms can adjust employment
after uncertainty is resolved. Hence, the marginal revenue product of capital is convex in the output
price and, by Jensens inequality, greater price variability translates into a higher expected return
to capital and higher investment.
This theoretical conclusion has been contradicted by empirical research as no study has found
a positive investment-uncertainty correlation; estimates range from negative to zero. Most of the
empirical evidence is about the relationship between investment and uncertainty at the aggregate
level. Many studies are based either on country data (see Ramey and Ramey, 1995, Aizenman
and Marion, 1999, Pindyck and Solimano, 1993, Calcagnini and Saltari, 2000, Alesina and Perotti,
1996) or on highly aggregated data (see Huizinga, 1993, Ferderer, 1993a, 1993b). Only Leahy and
Whited (1996), Guiso and Parigi (1999) and Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2005) do empirical
work at the micro level.
Investment irreversibility has been one of the rst elements considered by economic theory
to explain the negative e¤ect of uncertainty on investment. Bernanke (1983), McDonald and
Siegel (1986), Pindyck (1988) and Bertola (1988) show that, if the rm cannot resell its capital
goods, then the optimal investment policy derived under reversibility, equalization of the marginal
revenue product of capital and the Jorgensonian user cost of capital (Jorgenson, 1963), does not
hold anymore. In particular, if investment is irreversible, the rm invests only when the marginal
revenue product of capital is higher than a threshold that exceeds the Jorgensonian user cost of
capital because the rm takes into account that the irreversibility constraint may be binding in the
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following periods. The di¤erence between this threshold and the Jorgensonian user cost of capital
represents the value of the option of investing in the future. A higher degree of uncertainty implies
a higher threshold for investing since the value of the option is always increasing in the variance of
the stochastic variable.
The higher threshold for investing under irreversibility does not necessarily translates into lower
investment however. For this to happen, two additional conditions must be satised. The rst con-
dition, highlighted by Caballero (1991), Pindyck (1993) and Abel and Eberly (1997), is that the
marginal revenue product of capital is a decreasing function of the capital stock, i.e. that the rm
operates under imperfect competition and/or decreasing returns to scale.1 Under perfect compe-
tition and constant returns to scale the marginal revenue product of capital is independent of the
capital stock so that current investment does not a¤ect the current and future marginal protability
of capital, which implies that investment irreversibility does not change optimal investment.
The second condition required for the higher threshold for investing under irreversibility to
generate lower investment is that the current capital of the rm is zero, which would be the case for
a rm just getting started. This condition has been noted by Abel and Eberly (1999) who analyze
the e¤ect of irreversibility and uncertainty on the long-run capital stock (so that capital must be
positive). They show that irreversibility and uncertainty have two e¤ects on investment. One is the
increase in the user cost of capital described above that tends to reduce the capital stock compared
to the case with reversibility. But there is also a hangover e¤ect, which implies a higher capital
stock under irreversibility than under reversibility because investment irreversibility prevents the
rm from selling capital when the marginal revenue product of capital is low. Abel and Eberly
demonstrate that neither of the two e¤ects dominates globally, so that irreversibility may increase
1A decreasing marginal revenue product of capital was necessary in the initial models of irreversible investment
under uncertainty to bound the size of the rm given the standard assumptions of complete irreversibility and
absence of upward adjustment costs. Later contributions to this literature, as Abel and Eberly (1994, 1996, 1997),
have provided solutions to the problem of optimal investment under uncertainty in more general frameworks allowing,
for example, for xed costs of investment, adjustment costs and partial irreversibility.
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or decrease capital accumulation in the long-run. Higher uncertainty reinforces both the user cost
e¤ect and the hangover e¤ect and, therefore, does not help in obtaining an unambiguous result.
If the rm has zero capital stock, the hangover e¤ect is inoperative and the user cost e¤ect is the
only e¤ect at work, which implies that an increase in uncertainty with investment irreversibility
always lower the level of capital stock compared to the case with reversibility. It is also worthwhile
noticing that the works with adjustment costs and irreversibility use partial equilibrium models
with an exogenous risk-free interest rate so that it is not clear whether the results of these papers
are about sectoral investment or aggregate investment.
To obtain a robust negative relationship between investment and uncertainty, economic theory
has taken into consideration the role of risk aversion in general equilibrium frameworks, so incor-
porating the role of savings into the model. Craine (1989) uses a model with many sectors and risk
averse households to show that an increase in exogenous risk in one sector may lead, under some
conditions, to capital being reallocated toward less risky sectors. Zeira (1990) makes a similar point
in a model where sectors di¤er in the intensity of capital and labor used. He shows that, in some
cases, higher labor cost uncertainty may shift capital from labor intensive sectors toward less risky,
capital intensive, sectors. Even though Craine and Zeira use general equilibrium models, they both
concentrate on the e¤ect of uncertainty on the reallocation of savings and investment across sectors
and in their work there is no e¤ect of uncertainty on aggregate savings/investment.2
Our goal here is instead to analyze the e¤ect of an increase in aggregate, and hence non-
diversiable, uncertainty on aggregate equilibrium investment when agents are risk averse. There-
fore, we propose a dynamic general equilibrium model where households are risk averse and rms
2The increase in sectoral uncertainty in the models of Craine and Zeira also leads to an increase in aggregate
uncertainty. The increase in aggregate risk does not a¤ect aggregate investment in Craines model, however, because
the households instantaneous utility function is logarithmic, which implies that aggregate savings and aggregate
investment are a xed fraction of total output. Therefore, aggregate risk makes the time path for investment more
volatile but does not a¤ect the aggregate savings/investment decision rule. This is also the case in the overlapping
generations model of Zeira where he assumes that each individual of the young generation, independently on the
realization of the (real wage) shock, always works one unit of time, gets the real wage and saves it all.
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are subject to aggregate exogenous shocks. This setting allows us to focus on the e¤ect of aggre-
gate uncertainty on aggregate investment instead of the e¤ect of uncertainty on the distribution
of investment across sectors as analyzed in Craine (1989) or Zeira (1990). A key feature of our
model is that we use Kreps-Porteus nonexpected utility preferences (recursive preferences) in order
to separate the role of risk aversion from that of intertemporal substitution. As is well-known, the
conventional expected utility set up with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences makes
it impossible to separate the role of these two parameters.
We show that risk aversion cannot by itself explain a negative relationship between investment
and uncertainty at the aggregate level as the e¤ect of increased uncertainty on investment also de-
pends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. For example, we show that if the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is low, then an increase in aggregate uncertainty has a positive e¤ect on
aggregate investment even if risk aversion is very high. If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution
is high, however, then even small degrees of risk aversion imply a negative investment-uncertainty
relationship. Intuitively, in a dynamic framework, a high degree of risk aversion reduces the cer-
tainty equivalent of the return to capital. This does not necessarily lower investment however. The
reason is that a lower rate of return to capital generates a substitution e¤ect and an income e¤ect
a¤ecting aggregate savings and, therefore, aggregate investment in opposite directions. The substi-
tution e¤ect reduces aggregate savings and investment while the income e¤ect increases aggregate
savings/investment. The relative strength of these two e¤ects is determined by the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution. If the elasticity of substitution is lower than unity, the income ef-
fect dominates and the equilibrium investment increases as a result of increased uncertainty. The
opposite happens if the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity.
We characterize the aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship for all possible parameter
values of the Kreps-Porteus nonexpected utility preferences as well as for the standard CRRA ex-
pected utility preferences (which are a special case of the recursive preferences). We show that the
relationship is generally ambiguous and depends on the value of technological and preference para-
meters. A negative relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty requires
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that the relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are both relatively
high or both relatively low. If this is not the case, the relationship is positive. With CRRA prefer-
ences the region of the parameter values where the relationship is negative is generally small and
the fact that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is the inverse of the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion implies that high values of risk aversion always lead to a positive correlation between
aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty.3 We also study the investment-uncertainty re-
lationship implied by empirically plausible values of the relative risk aversion and the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution and nd that the wide range of estimates available in the literature
implies that our model is compatible with a negative, positive, or no relationship between aggregate
investment and aggregate uncertainty.
Our results therefore suggest that risk aversion, as well as irreversibility, is not enough to
generate a theoretically robust negative investment-uncertainty relationship. Indeed, even though
increased uncertainty in one sector may reduce investment in that sector, the same needs not to be
true at the aggregate level as the e¤ect of uncertainty on aggregate savings/investment is di¤erent
than the e¤ect of uncertainty on the allocation of savings and investment across sectors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model with recursive preferences and
analyzes the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and aggregate investment for all possible
values of the coe¢ cients of relative risk aversion and intertemporal substitution elasticity. Section
3 relates the implications of the model to the evidence on the investment-uncertainty relationship.
Section 4 concludes. Detailed proofs of the main propositions and an extension of the baseline
model can be found in the Appendix.
3 It is immediate that this result can be understood only using recursive preferences that allows us to separate the
role of risk aversion from the role of intertemporal substitution.
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2 The model
We assume that the technology of the competitive rm is described by the following constant
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = BtK
1 
t L

t (1)
whereKt is the stock of capital, Lt is the amount of labor employed andBt = Be#t is a multiplicative
shock to the production function. We assume that B is a constant and #t is an identically and
independently distributed normal random variable with variance 2 and mean #   122.4 This
parametrization implies that the expected value of the multiplicative shock is a function of # only
(does not depend on 2) and that the variance of the multiplicative shock is increasing in 2.
Hence, an increase in 2 increases the variance of the multiplicative shock (and hence the degree
of uncertainty) without a¤ecting its expected value. The parameters # and 2 are assumed to be
constant over time.5 The i:i:d: assumption is crucial for the derivation of the investment function,
and the log-normality assumption permits us to derive the e¤ect of uncertainty on investment
analytically.6
We assume that the rm can adjust the amount of labor employed in each period but that the
capital stock is decided one period in advance. In each period, the rm rst observes the realization
of the shock and then adjust the amount of labor. Choosing output as the numeraire, the rms
operating prot (i.e. revenues minus the cost of variable inputs) is therefore equal to
4 In this Section, we only discuss the e¤ect of technological uncertainty on aggregate investment. In Appendix D,
we extend this framework to analyze also the e¤ect of preference shocks.
5As most models in this literature, we make a comparative static analysis and do not allow for time-varying
uncertainty. See, for example, Guo, Miao and Morellec (2005) for a contribution that analyzes the dynamic of
investment when the growth rate and volatility of the marginal revenue product of capital are subject to discrete
regime shifts at random times.
6The i:i:d: assumption is also made in Craine (1989) and Zeira (1990). The investment function and the e¤ect of
uncertainty on investment cannot be derived analytically when the shock is subject to a trend or displays persistence.
In this case it is necessary to use numerical solution methods.
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t = maxfLtg

BtK
1 
t L

t   wLt
	
(2)
where w is the real wage. We assume the real wage w to be constant, which will be true in
equilibrium. The optimal amount of labor according to the maximization problem in (2) is
Lt =

w
 1
1 
B
1
1 
t Kt (3)
and the operating prot is
t = B
1
1 
t Kt (4)
where   (1  )  w 1  . If we dene At = Ae#t where A =  1B is a constant and  = 11  > 1
(given that  < 1), then the operating prot can be written as
t = A

tKt: (5)
We assume that one unit of capital is produced with one unit of output. Hence, the rms cash
ow at time t is
t = A

tKt   It: (6)
where At represents the marginal revenue product of capital at time t. Given that  > 1, the prot
function is convex in the random variable as in Abel (1983) and Hartman (1972). This comes from
the fact that the capital stock is chosen before the realization of the shock and the employment of
labor.
The rm is owned by the representative household. The representative household supplies labor
and chooses consumption for t = 1; 2; ::: to maximize the following Kreps-Porteus nonexpected
utility
Vt (Kt; #t) = maxfCt;Ltg
U [Ct; Lt; EtVt+1]
9
 max
fCt;Ltg
n
(1  ) (Ct   Lt)1  +  [1 + (1  ) (1  )EtVt+1 (Kt+1; #t+1)]
1 
1 
o 1 
1    1
(1  ) (1  )
where Ct is consumption and  is the constant opportunity cost of supplying labor, which in
equilibrium will be equal to the real wage w. The parameters that characterize this representation
of preferences are  2 (0; 1),  > 0, and  > 0.  is the subjective discount factor under certainty.
Time preference under uncertainty is endogenous except  = , i.e. unless we have Von Neumann-
Morgenstern (VNM) time- and state-separable isoelastic preferences.  is the coe¢ cient of relative
risk aversion for timeless gambles and 1 = " is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for
deterministic consumption paths.7 We start our analysis by assuming that both  6= 1 and  6= 1.
Then, we consider the case with unit intertemporal substitution elasticity ( = 1) and with unit
relative risk aversion ( = 1).
It can be shown easily that the competitive equilibrium allocation of this economy is equivalent
to the allocation where the central planner chooses investment by solving the following maximization
problem
Vt (Kt; #t) = maxfItg
U [t; EtVt+1] (7)
 max
fItg
n
(1  )1 t +  [1 + (1  ) (1  )EtVt+1 (Kt+1; #t+1)]
1 
1 
o 1 
1    1
(1  ) (1  )
subject to the capital accumulation equation
Kt+1 = (1  )Kt + It (8)
7For a general discussion of the properties of these preferences and for a better understanding of the role played by
the preference parameters see Kreps and Porteus (1978, 1979), Epstein and Zin (1989, 1991), Weil (1989, 1990) and
Giovannini and Weil (1989). The last three papers clarify the importance of i.i.d. uncertainty for obtaining closed
form solutions. For a two-period application of these preferences see Selden (1978).
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where  is the rate of capital depreciation. For notational simplicity, from now on we will use
Vt  Vt (Kt; #t) and Vt+1  Vt+1 (Kt+1; #t+1).
Our guess of the value function for the maximization problem in (7) and (8) is the same as in
the VNM isoelastic utility case:
Vt =
 1  [At + (1  )]1  K1 t   1
(1  ) (1  ) (9)
with the investment function given by
It = A

tKt    [At + (1  )]Kt (10)
where  and  are constants to be determined. Solving the maximization problem (details can be
found in Appendix A) we obtain that the unknown constant  is
 =

(1  )  11  (11)
and that
 = 1   1
h
Et
 
At+1 + (1  )
1 i 11  1 
: (12)
2.1 The relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty
The e¤ect of uncertainty on investment can be obtained by di¤erentiating equation (10) with respect
to the volatility 2 of the shock
dIt
d2
=   d
d2
[At + (1  )]Kt: (13)
It is easy to see from equation (12) that it is not possible to derive a closed form solution for d=d2
except in the case where capital fully depreciates in production. Therefore, we assume  = 1 and
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obtain8
 = 1   1
h
Et

A
(1 )
t+1
i 1
1 
 1 

= 1   1A 1 
n
e#+
1
2
( )22
o 1 

: (14)
This implies
dIt
d2
=
1
2

1
 2A
 1 

(1  ) (  )

n
e#+
1
2
( )22
o 1 

AtKt
and
sign

dIt
d2

= sign [(1  ) (  )] = sign [("  1) (  )] : (15)
Table 1 summarizes the sign between investment and uncertainty for di¤erent values of preference
and technology parameters.9 It can be seen that the relationship between investment and uncer-
tainty is negative when the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  and the intertemporal substitution
elasticity " are both relatively high or both relatively low. More precisely, there is a negative
investment-uncertainty relationship in two situations: when the coe¢ cient of relative risk aver-
sion is greater than the elasticity of output to labor ( > ) and the coe¢ cient of intertemporal
substitution is greater than one (" > 1); and when  <  and " < 1.
For a more intuitive understanding of our results imagine a consumer-producer facing the de-
cision of allocating output between consumption and investment, where total output is equal to
the sum of operating prots and labor income (see equation (2)).10 The investment function in
(10) (with  = 1) implies that this problem is solved by always investing a fraction 1    of
operating prots and consuming a fraction . It is immediate to see that total consumption is
Ct =


1  + 

AtKt, where

1 A

tKt is equal to labor income. Hence,  can be interpreted
8 It is often the case that complete depreciation is necessary for analytical solutions in dynamic setting with capital.
See for example Long and Plosser (1983) and (in the investment literature) Craine (1989).
9The particular case where  = 1 will be derived and discussed later.
10The consumer-producer interpretation is natural given that we use a representative consumer and a representative
rm in a framework where there are no imperfections.
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as the marginal propensity to consumeout of operating prots: when  increases consumption
increases at the expense of investment. The key distribution coe¢ cient  can be rewritten as11
 = 1  " Z" 1 (16)
where
Z 
h
Et

A
(1 )
t+1
i 1
1 
(17)
is the certainty equivalent of the marginal revenue product of capital (or, given the assumption of
full capital depreciation, the certainty equivalent of the return to capital). To see this, notice that
the return to capital is At+1, which is what the consumer-producer will receive at time t+ 1 if she
consumes one unit less at time t and invests it in capital. As the individual is risk averse, she will
take her decision by considering the certainty equivalent of the return to capital, i.e. Z. Under the
assumption that shocks are i:i:d: and lognormally distributed the certainty equivalent of the return
to capital is
Z 
h
Et

A
(1 )
t+1
i 1
1 
= Ae#+
1
2
( )22 (18)
which is increasing in the variance 2 of the shock if  <  and decreasing if  > .12 The intuition
for this result is straightforward. When uncertainty increases there are two e¤ects at work. The
rst, which might be called exibility e¤ect, comes from the fact that the consumer-producer can
substitute labor for capital after observing the realization of the shock. This implies that the return
to capital is convex with respect to the shock. Therefore, by Jensens inequality, the expected return
to capital is increasing in the volatility of the shock and the size of this relationship is positively
related to the elasticity of output with respect to labor . The second e¤ect, which we call risk
aversion e¤ect, is generated by the agents risk aversion. Indeed, given that the agent is risk averse,
11We are using the fact that 1

 " and therefore 1 

 "  1.
12 It is immediate to verify from (18) that @
Z
@2
R 0 if  R .
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she does not take her decisions considering the expected return to capital but the correspondent
certainty equivalent, which is negatively related to the riskiness of the return, here represented by
the variance of the shock. It is clear that the magnitude of this e¤ect increases with the degree of
risk aversion  of the consumer-producer. The nal e¤ect of uncertainty on the certainty equivalent
of the return to capital Z depends on which of the two e¤ects is bigger. If risk aversion is su¢ ciently
small ( <  < 1) for the exibility e¤ect to prevail over the risk aversion e¤ect, then Z will be
increasing in the variance 2 of the shock. If risk aversion is big enough ( > ), then the risk
aversion e¤ect is stronger than the exibility e¤ect and Z will be decreasing in the shocks volatility.
Hence, an increase in uncertainty changes the certainty equivalent of the return to capital.
This gives rise to an income and a substitution e¤ect a¤ecting aggregate investment in opposite
directions. The nal e¤ect of aggregate uncertainty on aggregate investment will depend on the
magnitude of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution because " determines the relative strength
of income and substitution e¤ects. To see how things work, let us assume that the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion is lower than the elasticity of output with respect to labor ( <  < 1) so that
an increase in uncertainty produces an increase in the certainty equivalent of the return to capital Z.
The substitution e¤ect induces the consumer-producer to save and invest more (and consequently
consume less) because capital is more productive. The income e¤ect (due to the fact that a higher
productivity of capital makes the consumer-producer richer) implies higher consumption and lower
savings and investment. If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is greater than one (" > 1),
then the substitution e¤ect prevails over the income e¤ect and investment will increase. This is
immediate from equation (16): an increase in Z leads to a decrease in  whenever " > 1. If the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than one (" < 1), then the income e¤ect more than
balances the substitution e¤ect. This leads the agent to consume more and invest less. Equation
(16) shows how an increase in Z implies an increase in  whenever " < 1.
A similar argument applies to the situation where the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is higher
than the elasticity of output to labor ( > ).13 In this case an increase in uncertainty reduces the
13Even though the discussion on the empirically plausible values of the parameters is presented in the next Section,
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certainty equivalent of the return to capital. The substitution e¤ect induces the consumer-producer
to invest less because the return to capital (in certainty equivalent terms) is lower. On the other
hand, the income e¤ect increases investment by pushing down the individuals consumption because
the lower productivity of capital makes the consumer-producer poorer. Again, if the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is greater than one (" > 1), then the substitution e¤ect more than
balances the income e¤ect and investment decreases, while the opposite happens when " < 1.14
2.2 Two special cases: unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution and CRRA
Let us now consider the case with unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution ( = 1). The
maximization problem is now given by equation15
Vt = maxfItg
n

(1 )(1 )
t (EtVt+1)

o
:
By making the same guess and performing the same steps of the previous maximization problem,
we obtain that investment is still given by equation (10) but that
it is worthy to notice since now that  >  is the relevant region of the parameter space given that  < 1.
14At this point it may be useful to clarify the di¤erence between our model and the standard model of intertemporal
consumption choice. An increase in the volatility of the future income ows always increases savings in the standard
model as it generates a precautionary savings e¤ect (i.e. a negative income e¤ect) given the widespread assumptions
of convex marginal utility (see Leland, 1968) and existence of a risk-free asset. So one may think that in our model an
increase in uncertainty would increase savings and investment for the same reason. But this is not the case because
in our model uncertainty is in the return of the asset used to transfer wealth over time. In the terminology of Sandmo
(1970), in our model there is a capital risk instead of the income risk of the standard model. An increase in
uncertainty of the return to capital (assuming that  >  so that the exibility e¤ect is dominated by the risk aversion
e¤ect) generates an income e¤ect (precautionary savings e¤ect) also in our model because it raises the probability of
low levels of consumption in the following period. This leads the agents to insure themselves by consuming less today
so increasing the current level of savings. However, in our model there is also a substitution e¤ect as the agents try
to reduce their exposure to risk by increasing current consumption and reducing savings (given that uncertainty is
on the savings vehicle). The magnitude of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution denes the relative strength of
the income and substitution e¤ects.
15See Appendix B for the mathematical details.
15
 = 1  :
It is immediate that in this case investment is not a¤ected by uncertainty for any given value of
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion: this result holds even with partial depreciation of capital.
This is because, independently from what happens to the certainty equivalent of the return to
capital (i.e.  Q ), income and substitution e¤ects exactly o¤set each other (as in the logarithmic
preference case).16
Another particular case is the one corresponding to the CRRA preferences: these preferences
are obtained when the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is equal to the inverse of the intertemporal
substitution elasticity ( =   1" ). Clearly, the investment function is still given by equation (10)
with  (see equation (12)) equal to
 = 1   1
h
Et
 
At+1 + (1  )
1 i 11  1 
:
As before, to get a closed form solution for the e¤ect of uncertainty on investment it is necessary
to assume complete depreciation of capital ( = 1). In this case
 = 1   1
h
Et

A
(1 )
t+1
i 1
1 
 1 

= 1   1A 1 
n
e#+
1
2
( )22
o 1 

and
dIt
d2
=
1
2

1
 2
(1  ) (  )

n
e#+
1
2
( )22
o 1 

AtKt
which means that
sign

dIt
d2

= sign [(1  ) (  )] :
16As we already said, logarithmic preferences correspond to the case where  =  = 1. The maximization problem
when the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is equal to one ( = 1) can be found in Appendix C. The results and
the interpretation correspond to the case discussed above where  > , given that  is always lower than one.
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Table 2 summarizes the relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty
for di¤erent values of the relative risk aversion coe¢ cient. It is easy to see that the e¤ect of uncer-
tainty on investment is generally positive except when  <  < 1.17 This is because with CRRA
preferences the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is the inverse of the elasticity of intertempo-
ral substitution ( = 1="), which implies that only two main situations are possible. First, the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is less than one ( < 1): this implies that the elasticity of in-
tertemporal substitution is greater than one (" > 1). If  <  < 1, then greater uncertainty reduces
the certainty equivalent of the return to capital Z. As " > 1, the substitution e¤ect prevails over
the income e¤ect, leading to lower investment. When risk aversion is small enough (0 <  <  < 1),
then more uncertainty increases the certainty equivalent of the return to capital Z and this raises
investment.18 The second situation is when the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is greater than
one ( > 1). Hence, it is greater than the elasticity of output with respect to labor  and the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than one (" < 1). In this case greater uncertainty
decreases the certainty equivalent of the expected return to capital Z (as  > ). The fact that the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution is less than one implies that the income e¤ect more than
balances the substitution e¤ect, and this implies higher investment.19
2.3 The investment-uncertainty relationship under partial capital depreciation
In the analysis developed above we have assumed that capital fully depreciates in production
( = 1) in order to obtain a closed form solution for the relationship between aggregate investment
and aggregate uncertainty. We now relax this assumption and analyze what happens when the
17Moreover, what seems to be surprising is that the investment-uncertainty relationship is positive when agents are
very risk averse ( > 1).
18 It is immediate that if  =  then volatility has no e¤ect on Z (because the exibility e¤ect and the risk aversion
e¤ect exactly compensate each other) and therefore it does not a¤ect investment.
19 If the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is equal to one (and to the elasticity of intertemporal substitution)
then the utility function is logarithmic. In this case uncertainty has no e¤ect on investment because the income and
substitution e¤ect exactly o¤set each other (given that " = 1).
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depreciation of capital is only partial ( < 1) using numerical simulation methods. Similarly to the
case of  = 1, the determination of the aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship requires the
analysis of the behavior of the distribution parameter  with respect to 2.20 This parameter is
still given by (16) but the certainty equivalent of the return to capital is now equal to
Z 
h
Et
 
At+1 + (1  )
1 i 11 
: (19)
This implies that removing the assumption of full capital depreciation may have an e¤ect only
on the certainty equivalent of the return to capital and therefore on the relative strength of the
exibility e¤ect and the risk aversion e¤ect. Indeed, it is immediate to verify from (16) that once
we have determined the e¤ect of uncertainty (represented by 2) on Z, the income and substitution
e¤ects work as usual. If the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is greater than one (" > 1),
the substitution e¤ect prevails over the income e¤ect and vice versa. This means that we can
concentrate our analysis on the e¤ect of uncertainty on the certainty equivalent of the return to
capital Z.
In the previous section we have seen that Z is increasing in 2 if  <  and decreasing if  > 
when capital fully depreciates in production ( = 1). Given that it is not possible to obtain a closed
form solution for the derivative of Z with respect to 2 when  is lower than one, we have made a
numerical analysis. We have found that for each value of the capital depreciation , there exists a
threshold value of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  such that the certainty equivalent of the
return to capital Z is increasing in 2 if  <  and decreasing if  > .21 Figure 1 presents three
examples on the relationship between the derivative of Z with respect to 2 and the coe¢ cient of
relative risk aversion  for the following parameterization:  = 0:3, # = 0:2, A = 1,  = 0:67, and
for  = 0, 0:5 and 1. The results conrm that @
Z
@2
is positive if  < , it is zero at  and then
becomes negative for  > . The gure shows the derivative of Z with respect to 2 for only three
20This is apparent from an inspection of the derivative of the investment function with respect to 2 in (13).
21 In words, the threshold value of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion that denes the behavior of Z with respect
to uncertainty is  when  = 1 and  when  < 1. The properties of  are discussed below.
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values of , but its behavior is the same for all  2 [0; 1] as well as for other parameter values.22
Additional numerical simulations are presented in Table 3 and in Figures 2 and 3. Each column
of Table 3 contains the threshold values of  for di¤erent rates of capital depreciation . The value
of uncertainty  is indicated at the top of the column, the values of # can be found at the top of
each sub-table and the other parameter values are A = 1 and  = 0:67. From Table 3 (as well as
from Figures 2 and 3 that we discuss below) we can notice two things. First, the threshold  can
be higher or lower than one depending on the value of the parameters. Second, the threshold 
is monotonically decreasing in  and it is equal to  (as we already know) at  = 1. This can be
explained as follows. A lower  means that capital lasts longer. This allows the exibility e¤ect to
operate for more periods, which in turn implies that the agents risk aversion has to be relatively
higher for the risk aversion e¤ect to prevail over the exibility e¤ect.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the negative relationship between  and  and
shows how changes in the technological parameter # a¤ect the threshold . We observe that an
increase in # leads to a counterclockwise rotation of the schedule () around the point where
 = 1 and  = , namely it leads to a reduction in the threshold  for all  < 1. This result is
generated by the fact that a higher # increases the marginal productivity of capital and this in turn
reduces the relative importance of uncertainty so leading the threshold  closer to . Another
parameter that a¤ects positively the return to capital is A. The numerical simulations show that
the qualitative e¤ect of an increase in A on () is the same as the increase in #. For this reason
we omit the presentation of an example.
Finally, Figure 3 presents the results of a variation of  on . An increase in the elasticity
of output with respect to labor  strengthen the exibility e¤ect and leaves una¤ected the risk
aversion e¤ect. This implies an upward shift of the schedule () because for each value of  the
degree of risk aversion has now to be higher in order to allow the risk aversion e¤ect to balance
the exibility e¤ect.
Table 4 summarizes the relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty
22More numerical simulations are available from the authors on request.
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with recursive preferences when  < 1 and shows clearly that removing the assumption of full capital
depreciation does not change the results from a qualitatively point of view. The only variation when
 < 1 is on the value of the threshold of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion where the exibility
e¤ect and the risk aversion e¤ect exactly o¤set each other. This does not correspond to the
elasticity of output with respect to labor  anymore but will be  > . However, a negative
aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship still requires that the relative risk aversion and the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution are both relatively high or both relatively low.
Removing the assumption of full capital depreciation when preferences display CRRA may lead
to a variation in the results slightly greater than under recursive preferences because in this case the
coe¢ cient of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
are constrained to be one the reciprocal of the other. Indeed, it is now important to distinguish
between two possible situations depending on the threshold  being smaller or greater than one.23
Assume rst that  < 1. In this case there is a restriction of the region of the values of  where
the relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty is negative (see Table
5).24 Then, let us consider the situation where  > 1. The aggregate investment-uncertainty
relationship is now negative when 1 <  < . Indeed, if  <  the exibility e¤ect prevails
over the risk aversion e¤ect and an increase in uncertainty leads to an increase in the certainty
equivalent of the return to capital Z. If  is also lower than one, the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is greater than one, and the substitution e¤ect more than compensate the income e¤ect
leading to more investment. Instead, if 1 <  < , then " < 1 and the income e¤ect more than
balances the substitution e¤ect, which implies lower investment. Finally, consider the region where
 >  > 1. The risk aversion e¤ect is now stronger than the exibility e¤ect and an increase in
uncertainty lowers Z. Given that " < 1, the income e¤ect prevails over the substitution e¤ect and
23The situation where  is exactly equal to one cannot be excluded a priori. However, it is immediate that in this
case the investment-uncertainty relationship is always positive and absent at  = 1.
24We remind that under CRRA preferences and  = 1 the investment-uncertainty relationship is negative only
when  <  < 1. Instead, in this case ( < 1) the relationship is negative when  <  <  < 1.
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investment increases. These results are presented in Table 6.25
From this analysis we conclude that under CRRA preferences relaxing the assumption of full
capital depreciation does not change the main features of the aggregate investment-uncertainty
relationship, namely that the region of the values of  where this relationship is negative is close
to one, and that a su¢ ciently high level of risk aversion always leads aggregate investment and
aggregate uncertainty to be a positively related.
3 Discussion and empirical evidence
The aim of our work is to analyze the relationship between aggregate uncertainty and aggregate
investment. To this purpose, in the previous Section we have proposed a closed economy model
with only one asset (the representative rm) and we have analyzed the e¤ects of an increase in the
volatility of the returns of this asset on savings/investment. In our model we have assumed that
there is no alternative asset where the agents can invest their savings, like for example an external
asset, for the following reasons. First, we are interested in analyzing the response of aggregate
savings/investment to a systemic increase in risk, namely to a risk that cannot be eliminated by
households with a portfolio reallocation. In other words, we want to study the variation of aggregate
savings/investment when all activities in the economy become riskier and not what happens to
the investment in one sector when uncertainty in this sector (or other sectors) increases as the
analysis of these reallocation e¤ects is already well understood in Craine (1989) and Zeira (1990).
Second, there are many situations where the access to external capital markets is available only to
sophisticated investors while ordinary savers do not have this opportunity as a practical matter.
We now turn to the empirical evidence on the investment-uncertainty relationship. Even though
the theory of investment under uncertainty has been developed with reference to the single rm,
most of the evidence about the investment-uncertainty relationship is based on aggregate data.
25 It is clear that uncertainty does not a¤ect investment if  = 1 or  =  because in the rst case " = 1 and the
income and substitution e¤ects exactly compensate each other and in the second one the exibility e¤ect and the risk
aversion e¤ect have the same strength.
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We know of only three papers, Leahy and Whited (1996), Guiso and Parigi (1999) and Bloom,
Bond and Van Reenen (2005), where the investment-uncertainty relationship is investigated using
micro data. Cross-country and time series studies using aggregate data are instead quite abundant.
Ramey and Ramey (1995) in a sample of 92 countries (from 1960-1985) and 24 OECD countries
(from 1950-1988) nd that countries with higher volatility (of per capita annual growth rates or of
the innovations to growth) have lower growth but their evidence suggests that investment is not
an empirically important conduit between volatility and growth. Indeed, volatility appears to have
a negative relationship with investment and is signicant at the 10-percent level in the 92 country
sample, but not in the case of the OECD sample. However, once the other standard control variables
are included in the investment equation (see Levine and Renelt, 1992) the e¤ect of uncertainty on
investment is positive for the 92-country sample and negative in the OECD sample, but it is no
longer signicant in both cases. Thus, these authors nd little evidence that the investment share
of GDP is linked to volatility.
Aizenman and Marion (1999) investigate the investment-uncertainty relationship using a sample
of 46 developing countries over the period 1970-1992. They nd a statistically signicant negative
correlation between various volatility measures (two internal and one external) and private invest-
ment even when standard control variables are added. They also nd that there is no aggregate
investment-uncertainty correlation due to a positive relationship between uncertainty and public
investment spending.
Pindyck and Solimano (1993) use cross section and time series data for a set of developing and
industrialized countries and nd that the volatility of the marginal protability of capital (which
they use as summary measure of uncertainty) a¤ects aggregate investment negatively but that the
size of this e¤ect is moderate (overall larger for developing countries). A detailed analysis of the
shortcomings of their measure of uncertainty and their results can be found in Eberly (1993).
Calcagnini and Saltari (2000), using data on the Italian economy for the period 1971-1995, nd
that changes in the level of volatility of expected demand have a negative impact on aggregate
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investment.26
Alesina and Perotti (1996) analyze a sample of 71 countries for the period 1960-1985 and
nd a negative correlation between indices of political and social instability, taken as proxies of
uncertainty, and aggregate investment. A similar result is obtained by Barro (1991) who nds that
measures of political instability and aggregate investment are negatively related for 98 countries in
the period 1960-1985. These results are consistent with the nding of several other papers like, for
example, Aizenman and Marion (1993).
All the studies cited so far consider investment at the country level. There are also empirical
studies that use important parts of aggregate investment and that can therefore provide insightful
information on the aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship. For example, Huizinga (1993)
provides evidence that ination uncertainty reduces aggregate investment using U.S. manufactur-
ing data over the period 1954-1989. Ferderer (1993a) explores the empirical relationship between
uncertainty and real gross expenditures on producers durable equipment and the real value of
contracts and orders for new plant and equipment using U.S. data from 1969 to 1989. He measures
uncertainty about interest rates and other macroeconomic variables using the risk premium em-
bedded in the term structure and nds a signicant negative impact of uncertainty on investment.
Ferderer (1993b) obtains the same result with a di¤erent sample and methodology.
The aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship predicted by our model depends crucially on
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Two studies
that estimate these two parameters separately are Attanasio and Weber (1989) and Epstein and
Zin (1991). Attanasio and Weber nd an elasticity of intertemporal substitution between 1.946 and
2.247 and a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion ranging from 5.1 to 29.9. For these values, our model
predicts a negative relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty even when
we consider the case of partial capital depreciation given that the values of the coe¢ cient of relative
26 In the paper the investment rate refers to the whole economy while demand variables refer to industrial rms.
More precisely, the authors used monthly survey data about Italian industrial rms expectations regarding the
growth in orders over the 3-4 months to come.
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risk aversion obtained by Attanasio and Weber are pretty high. Epstein and Zin nd a coe¢ cient
of relative risk aversion close to one and a coe¢ cient of intertemporal substitution between 0.2 and
0.87. These parameter values would lead to a positive correlation between aggregate investment and
aggregate uncertainty in the baseline version of our model (i.e. with complete capital depreciation).
If we consider the model with partial capital depreciation (which is clearly more realistic), the
threshold  is higher than the elasticity of output with respect to labor ( = 0:67) and it can also
be higher than one. This means that with the Epstein and Zins estimates of " and  our model
is compatible with both a positive or a negative (or even absent) relationship between aggregate
investment and aggregate uncertainty.27
Most empirical work estimates the key parameters of our model using an expected utility frame-
work with a CRRA utility function (which implies that the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution are linked). Hansen and Singleton (1983), Eichennbaum,
Hansen, and Singleton (1988) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate a range of values for the
constant relative risk aversion parameter that is consistent with both a negative and a positive ag-
gregate investment-uncertainty relationship in our model (more or less independently on the degree
of capital depreciation that we may consider).28 Hansen and Singleton (1982) obtain an estimate of
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion in the range of 0.52 to 0.97, which in our model implies that
the relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty would be mostly negative
if we consider the case of complete depreciation of capital and mostly positive under partial capital
27 It is worthy to notice that the values of the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution are clearly important to determine the sign of the investment-uncertainty relationship. However, from a
quantitative point of view also the di¤erence between  and the threshold  and " and one are key. Indeed, if  is
very close to , as well as if " is very close to one, then the e¤ect of uncertainty on investment is likely to be low or
statistically not signicantly di¤erent from zero. On the other hand, we have just seen in the review of the empirical
literature that the absence of a statistically signicant relationship between investment and uncertainty is obtained
in some empirical works.
28Hansen and Singleton (1983) nd a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  in the range of zero to two. Eichennbaum,
Hansen, and Singleton (1988) estimate a  that varies between 0.5 and three while Gourinchas and Parker (2002)
nd a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion from 0.5 to 1.4.
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depreciation.
The estimates of the parameters of Hansen and Singleton (1982) as well of Epstein and Zin
(1991) are such that considering the results of our model with complete or partial capital deprecia-
tion may change the sign of the aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship. However, the range
of the estimates of the preference parameters is generally so wide that considering our model with
complete or partial capital depreciation does not change the result, namely that both a positive or
a negative relationship is possible.
4 Conclusions
This paper has analyzed the relationship between aggregate investment and aggregate uncertainty
when agents are risk averse. We have demonstrated that risk aversion does not necessarily imply a
negative aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship. This is somewhat surprising as the existing
literature appears to take for granted that the e¤ect of increased uncertainty on investment is
negative if agents are risk averse. We have claried that the di¤erence in the results is explained
by the fact that the existing literature has analyzed the role of risk aversion in the investment-
uncertainty relationship at the sectoral level while our work do it at the aggregate level.
Using recursive preferences, we show that understanding the e¤ect of uncertainty on aggregate
investment requires to separate the role of risk aversion from the role of intertemporal substitution.
This allows us also to explain why the e¤ect of uncertainty on aggregate investment can be positive
even when agents are very risk averse. In particular, we nd that a low elasticity of intertemporal
substitution leads to a positive association between investment and uncertainty even if (or, better,
especially if) agents are very risk averse. A negative relationship between aggregate investment
and aggregate uncertainty requires that the relative risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution are both relatively high or both relatively low. This result also claries why high levels
of risk aversion always give rise to a positive aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship when
preferences display CRRA.
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Solving the dynamic investment problem analytically has required making simplifying assump-
tions, but it is not evident (as we have shown for the case of partial capital depreciation) that these
assumptions drive our results. Still it would be interesting in future research to apply numerical
solution methods to a more general version of the framework proposed in this paper.
Appendix A
This Appendix shows the mathematical details of maximization problem (7). The rst order
condition of this problem is
(1  ) (1  ) t (A.1)
=  (1  ) [1 + (1  ) (1  )EtVt+1]
1 
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 1 (1  )Et

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:
Given (9), the value function at time t+ 1 is
Vt+1 =
 1 

At+1 + (1  )
1 
K1 t+1   1
(1  ) (1  ) : (A.2)
From (A.2) and (8) we can determine
dVt+1
dIt
=
 1 

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1 
K t+1
(1  ) : (A.3)
The capital accumulation equation (8) and the investment function (10) imply that
Kt+1 = (1  ) [At + (1  )]Kt: (A.4)
Substituting equation (A.4) into equations (A.3) and (A.2) leads respectively to
dVt+1
dIt
=
 1 

At+1 + (1  )
1 
(1  )  [At + (1  )]  K 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and
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The investment function in (10) implies that the cash ow at time t is
t =  [A

t + (1  )]Kt: (A.7)
Substituting equations (A.7), (A.6) and (A.5) into the rst order condition (A.1) and rearranging
terms we get
n
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Substituting (9), (A.6) and (A.7) into (7), after some manipulations we obtain
 1  = (1  )1  +  1  (1  )1 
n
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Using the rst order condition (A.8) into equation (A.9) leads to the following equation
 1  = (1  )1  +  1  (1  )1  1  

   (1 ) (1  ) : (A.10)
Rearranging terms allows us to get the unknown constant  of the value function
 =

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)  11  : (A.11)
Substituting this expression into equation (A.9) gives
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so that after some algebra we nd
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Given that the shock # is i:i:d:, equations (A.11) and (A.13) imply that  and  are constants and
therefore that our guess for the value function (9) was correct.29
Appendix B
This Appendix provide the mathematical details for the derivation of the investment function when
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is equal to one ( = 1). We start by computing the
limit of the aggregator function in (7) using lHopitals rule:
Vt = lim
!1
n
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 [1 + (1  ) (1  )EtVt+1]
1 
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 :
Therefore, the maximization problem is
Vt = maxfItg

(1 )(1 )
t (EtVt+1)
 (B.2)
where t is given by (6). The guess of the functional form for the value function is the same of the
VNM isoelastic utility
Vt =
 1  [At + (1  )]1  K1 t
(1  ) (1  ) (B.3)
with the investment function still given by equation (10).
29We restrict the values of the parameters , , , , , #, 2 and A to the case where the solution is such that
 > 0.
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The rst order condition of maximization problem (B.2) is
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From (B.3) we know that
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and by using this equation with the capital accumulation equation (8) we obtain
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Remember that the investment function in (10) implies that the capital accumulation equation and
the cash ow at time t can be expressed by equations (A.4) and (A.7) respectively. Therefore,
substituting equation (A.4) into (B.6) yields
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Using the capital accumulation equation (8), the value function (B.5) can be rewritten as
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Substituting equations (B.7), (B.8) and (A.7) into the rst order condition (B.4) implies that
(1  ) (1  ) 1 [At + (1  )] 1K 1t (B.9)
=
n
 (1  ) (1  ) 1 Et

At+1 + (1  )
1 
(1  )1  [At + (1  )]1  K1 t
o 1
 1 Et

At+1 + (1  )
1 
(1  )  [At + (1  )]  K t
(1  ) :
Simplifying we get
 = 1  : (B.10)
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Substituting this result in the functional equation (B.1) and using the equations (B.3), (B.8)
and (A.7) we get
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Rearranging terms
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which is a constant given that At+1 is i:i:d:. Hence, our guess was correct.
Appendix C
In this Appendix we derive the investment function for the case of unit coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion ( = 1). The limit of the aggregator function in (7) is
Vt = lim
!1
n
(1  )1 t +  [1 + (1  ) (1  )EtVt+1]
1 
1 
o 1 
1    1
(1  ) (1  ) (C.1)
=
ln
n
(1  )1 t + e(1 )(1 )EtVt+1
o
(1  ) (1  )
and the corresponding maximization problem
Vt = maxfItg
ln
n
(1  )1 t + e(1 )(1 )EtVt+1
o
(1  ) (1  ) : (C.2)
We guess the following functional form for the value function
Vt = (1  ) 1 ln [At + (1  )] + (1  ) 1 lnKt +  (C.3)
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which again implies that the investment function is given by equation (10). This also means that
equations (A.4) and (A.7) hold.
The rst order condition of (C.2) is
 t = e
(1 )(1 )EtVt+1Et

dVt+1
dIt

: (C.4)
From the value function (C.3) it follows that
Vt+1 = (1  ) 1 ln

At+1 + (1  )

+ (1  ) 1 lnKt+1 +  : (C.5)
Using equation (C.5) and the capital accumulation equation (8) we obtain
dVt+1
dIt
=
1
(1  )Kt+1 (C.6)
and with the capital accumulation equation (A.4)
dVt+1
dIt
=
1
(1  ) (1  ) [At + (1  )]Kt
: (C.7)
Taking into account the equations (A.7), (C.5) and (C.7), the rst order condition (C.4) becomes
  [At + (1  )] K t (C.8)
=   ef(1 )(1 )Et[(1 ) 1 ln[At+1+(1 )]+(1 ) 1 lnKt+1+ ]g 
 [(1  ) (1  ) (At + (1  ))Kt] 1 :
After some algebra this rst order condition can be rewritten as
(1  )

1  

= e
n
Et ln[At+1+(1 )]
(1 )
+(1 )(1 ) 
o
: (C.9)
Substituting this result in the functional equation (C.2) and using the equations (C.3), (C.5)
and (A.7), after some manipulation we get
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(1  ) [lnAt + lnKt + (1  ) ] (C.10)
= ln
n
(1  )1 A(1 )t K1 t +   e(1 ) lnKt+1  eEt lnA

t+1+(1 )(1 ) 
o
:
Using the fact that e(1 ) lnKt+1 = K1 t+1 and the rst order condition (C.9) we obtain
(1  ) ln [At + (1  )] + (1  ) lnKt + (1  ) (1  ) (C.11)
= lnf(1  )1  [At + (1  )]1 K1 t +
+ (1  )1  [At + (1  )]1 K1 t
(1  )

1  

g
and after some algebra
 =
ln (1  )   ln
(1  ) (1  ) : (C.12)
Substituting this expression in the maximization problem (C.2) we can recover the value of 
 = 1   1 e 1  fEt ln[At+1+(1 )]g (C.13)
which is a constant. Therefore, also  is constant and this implies that our guess was correct.
Similarly to the general case, a closed-form solution for the derivative of the investment with
respect to the volatility of the shock can be obtained only if we assume  = 1. Then,
 = 1   1 e 1  fEt ln(At+1)g (C.14)
= 1   1A 1  e 1  fEt(#t+1)g
= 1   1A 1  e 1  (#  122)
= 1  "A(" 1)e(" 1)(#  122):
In this case an increase in aggregate uncertainty has a negative e¤ect on aggregate investment if
the intertemporal substitution elasticity is greater than one (" > 1, i.e.  < 1) and a positive
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e¤ect when " < 1. This result and the interpretation correspond to the case discussed above where
 > . Although the procedure followed has involved a transformation of the utility function, the
nal result could be obtained directly form equations (16) and (18) substituting  = 1.
Appendix D. Preference shocks and real wage uncertainty
In this Appendix we propose an extension to the baseline version of our model to discuss the e¤ects
of real wage uncertainty on aggregate investment. To this purpose, we assume that the opportunity
cost of supplying labor  can change over time due to a preference shock and that t is an identically
and independently distributed log-normal random variable. In particular, t = e
't , where  is
a positive constant and 't is i.i.d. and normally distributed with variance v
2 and mean $   12v2
so that an increase in v2 increases the variance of t without a¤ecting its expected value. We also
assume that the parameters $ and v2 are constant over time and that the shocks #t and 't are
independent.30
The representative agent knows the value of t before taking the labor and consumption deci-
sions at time t but she only knows the distribution of  for the following periods. In equilibrium,
wt = t and therefore an increase in the variance v
2 of the preference shock implies a higher real
wage uncertainty.
From the optimization problem of the rm we obtain that the cash ow at time t is still given
by (6) but that
At = De
#tw t (D.1)
where D  (1  )1  B. It is straightforward to verify that the solution of the model derived
in Section 2 is still valid and that the aggregate investment function is given by (10) and (12).
30The i.i.d. assumption of t is essential to have an analytical solution for the investment function, while the
assumptions of log-normality of t and of independence between the preference and the technological shocks are key
to obtain an analytical solution for the relationship between each form of uncertainty and aggregate investment.
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What changes is the marginal revenue product of capital At that now contains two sources of
uncertainty (see (D.1)). Again, to derive analytically the relationship between aggregate investment
and aggregate uncertainty we need to assume that capital fully depreciates in production ( = 1).
The investment function is still It = (1   )AtKt and the e¤ects of technological and preference
uncertainty on investment are given by @It
@2
=   @
@2
AtKt and
@It
@v2
=   @
@v2
AtKt respectively.
Therefore, as before, to determine the e¤ect of uncertainty on investment we need to analyze
the e¤ect of uncertainty on the parameter . This parameter is still given by (16), namely  =
1  " Z" 1, but the certainty equivalent of the return to capital is now equal to31
Z 
h
Et

A
(1 )
t+1
i 1
1 
= D e# $+
1
2
( )22+ 1
2
2(1 )v2 : (D.2)
It is immediate that the results obtained in Section 2 on the relationship between aggregate
technological uncertainty and aggregate investment are also valid in this framework. Hence, we
now concentrate our analysis on the e¤ects of real wage uncertainty (generated by the preference
shocks) on aggregate investment. From (D.2) we observe that the certainty equivalent of the return
to capital Z is increasing in the variance v2 of the preference shock if  < 1= and decreasing if
 > 1=. Again, we have the usual two e¤ects at work. One is the exibility e¤ect that originates
from the fact that the consumer-producer chooses the optimal amount of labor after observing
the realization of the preference shock. This e¤ect implies that higher uncertainty increases the
expected return to capital. The other is the risk aversion e¤ect that comes from the individuals risk
aversion and that reduces Z when uncertainty increases. If the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion
is higher than 1=  1:5 (assuming that  = 0:67), then the risk aversion e¤ect prevails over
the exibility e¤ect and the certainty equivalent of the return to capital goes down as uncertainty
increases. The opposite holds for  < 1=.
The investment-wage uncertainty relationship is straightforward to obtain. If we dene  
1=, then Table 4 and Table 6, that we have derived for the case of partial capital depreciation, also
31Equation (D.2) is obtained using (D.1) with the equilibrium condition wt+1 = t+1 and taking into account that
the shocks #t and 't are independent.
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summarize the relationship between real wage uncertainty and aggregate investment under recursive
and CRRA preferences respectively. A negative relationship between real wage uncertainty and
aggregate investment under recursive preferences requires that the relative risk aversion and the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution are both relatively high or both relatively low. This is the
same result obtained with technological uncertainty. The only di¤erence is on the threshold of the
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion  which is now (1=) > 1 instead of  < 1. This also implies
that the region of  where there is a negative correlation between investment and uncertainty under
CRRA preferences is between one and 1=.
This analysis allows us to conclude that the existence of uncertainty on the real wage does not
change the main results of our model.
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Table 1. The aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship with recursive preferences and  = 1.
dI
d2
 >   =   < 
" < 1 ;  > 1 > 0 = 0 < 0
" = 1 ;  = 1 = 0 = 0 = 0
" > 1 ;  < 1 < 0 = 0 > 0
Table 2. The aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship with CRRA preferences and  = 1.
0 <  <   =   <  < 1  = 1  > 1
dI
d2
> 0 = 0 < 0 = 0 > 0
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Table 3. Threshold values of . Parameter values: A = 1,  = 0:67.
Threshold values of  with #=0.1
 =.05 =.1 =.2 =.3 =.4 =.5
0 1.164 1.161 1.148 1.127 1.1 1.069
0.1 1.115 1.113 1.104 1.088 1.065 1.039
0.2 1.066 1.064 1.059 1.047 1.03 1.007
0.3 1.016 1.016 1.013 1.005 0.992 0.976
0.4 0.967 0.967 0.967 0.964 0.955 0.942
0.5 0.918 0.919 0.921 0.921 0.916 0.907
0.6 0.868 0.87 0.873 0.876 0.875 0.871
0.7 0.819 0.82 0.825 0.83 0.832 0.832
0.8 0.769 0.771 0.775 0.781 0.786 0.788
0.9 0.72 0.721 0.724 0.729 0.734 0.739
1 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Threshold values of  with #=0.2
 =.05 =.1 =.2 =.3 =.4 =.5
0 1.035 1.035 1.031 1.022 1.006 0.988
0.1 0.999 0.999 0.997 0.991 0.98 0.964
0.2 0.963 0.963 0.963 0.96 0.952 0.939
0.3 0.926 0.927 0.929 0.928 0.923 0.913
0.4 0.89 0.891 0.894 0.895 0.893 0.887
0.5 0.853 0.855 0.859 0.862 0.862 0.859
0.6 0.817 0.818 0.823 0.828 0.83 0.83
0.7 0.78 0.782 0.786 0.792 0.796 0.798
0.8 0.744 0.745 0.749 0.754 0.76 0.764
0.9 0.707 0.707 0.71 0.714 0.719 0.724
1 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Threshold values of  with #=0.3
 =.05 =.1 =.2 =.3 =.4 =.5
0 0.94 0.941 0.942 0.94 0.934 0.923
0.1 0.913 0.914 0.917 0.917 0.912 0.904
0.2 0.886 0.888 0.891 0.892 0.89 0.884
0.3 0.859 0.861 0.865 0.868 0.868 0.862
0.4 0.832 0.834 0.838 0.843 0.844 0.843
0.5 0.805 0.807 0.812 0.817 0.82 0.82
0.6 0.778 0.78 0.785 0.79 0.795 0.797
0.7 0.751 0.753 0.757 0.763 0.768 0.771
0.8 0.724 0.725 0.729 0.734 0.739 0.744
0.9 0.697 0.698 0.7 0.703 0.708 0.712
1 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
Threshold values of  with #=0.4
 =.05 =.1 =.2 =.3 =.4 =.5
0 0.87 0.871 0.875 0.877 0.876 0.872
0.1 0.85 0.851 0.855 0.859 0.859 0.857
0.2 0.83 0.831 0.836 0.84 0.842 0.841
0.3 0.81 0.812 0.816 0.821 0.824 0.824
0.4 0.79 0.792 0.796 0.802 0.806 0.807
0.5 0.77 0.772 0.776 0.782 0.787 0.789
0.6 0.75 0.751 0.756 0.761 0.767 0.77
0.7 0.73 0.731 0.735 0.74 0.746 0.75
0.8 0.71 0.711 0.714 0.718 0.723 0.728
0.9 0.69 0.691 0.692 0.695 0.699 0.702
1 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
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Table 4. The aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship with recursive preferences and  < 1.
dI
d2
 >   =   < 
" < 1 ;  > 1 > 0 = 0 < 0
" = 1 ;  = 1 = 0 = 0 = 0
" > 1 ;  < 1 < 0 = 0 > 0
Table 5. The aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship with CRRA preferences,  < 1 and
 < 1.
0 <  <   =   <  < 1  = 1  > 1
dI
d2
> 0 = 0 < 0 = 0 > 0
Table 6. The aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship with CRRA preferences,  < 1 and
 > 1.
0 <  < 1  = 1 1 <  <   =   > 
dI
d2
> 0 = 0 < 0 = 0 > 0
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Figure 1. The derivative of Z with respect to 2. Parameter values:  = 0:3,
# = 0:2, A = 1,  = 0:67.
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Figure 2. The e¤ect of a variation of # on (). Parameter values:  = 0:3, A = 1,
 = 0:67.
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Figure 3. The e¤ect of a variation of  on (). Parameter values:  = 0:3,
# = 0:2, A = 1.
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